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H ~ " � � | C � { � � � / � � $ x K ) � q l � " � � j � � ? � � � n � = � O � � Q # W � � � Y � _ � + � s � � � � � L � � y � � 5 � r B � 9 � � , $ � / � � � � � 1 � � ^ ' � b E J � � c � � � � \ o � � 4 I V � � � � � � � # � i 6 � 1 � � A " � O s H r ~ [ � B � X : � � M P � � E � � � z o � Y t � � � � � � J D � � B 1 � W � � � * � V � & � Z � y P + � ~ � # � * G � � U � c F � � . n C | � � E � � S � r N � � K � < � 2 ? � � � � j G ] � � � � � � : � e � N F � � � � s q � � T � J L � � % � � � � � _ * t � S m � � � f > & 6 M * \ � � T � X ; � � } � � � � � / 9 D x l � m � 7 � � ? < � � � 7 $ � 4 : f 0 � - ( i g @ m � x @ � � d b V < a � h � t E � > � ` � w u ] Q D � L j < � R / � � e 4 H � i � � � � � d � O � � � n � ] a � 9 | Z f � � w � � Y C K � � q � � � � A z � � � � a c � � w � N � ^ � � � � � � � � 1 � i C � R 5 ! � � 4 � � = � � ' $ ` � � k u � U [ v � � � f ! � ] � � ! ) 2 � ^ � o � & Y ; a � p � � � v � \ � m � � y \ � 6 p v � � � - 2 � A ' { ( T S � V 3 � 5 0 q � � � � + � , b M , n � W b � 0 ~ _ � : � � � I T ^ j � � � N � � p � 3 � � } � W u g % P � = h � ? 8 . � � h Q X � � x � I X F ` � @ H � R � 3 R � 8 %.0f minute remaining %.0f minutes remaining %s BMC Update %s Battery Update %s CPU Microcode Update %s Camera Update %s Configuration Update %s Consumer ME Update %s Controller Update %s Corporate ME Update %s Device Update %s Display Update %s Dock Update %s Drive Update %s Embedded Controller Update %s Fingerprint Reader Update %s Flash Drive Update %s GPU Update %s Graphics Tablet Update %s Headphones Update %s Headset Update %s Input Controller Update %s Keyboard Update %s ME Update %s Mouse Update %s Network Interface Update %s SSD Update %s Storage Controller Update %s System Update %s TPM Update %s Thunderbolt Controller Update %s Touchpad Update %s Touchscreen Update %s USB Dock Update %s USB Receiver Update %s Update %s and all connected devices may not be usable while updating. %s appeared: %s %s changed: %s → %s %s disappeared: %s %s is not currently updatable: %s is pending activation; use %s to complete the update. %s manufacturing mode %s must remain connected for the duration of the update to avoid damage. %s must remain plugged into a power source for the duration of the update to avoid damage. %s override %s v%s %s version %u day %u days %u device has a firmware upgrade available. %u devices have a firmware upgrade available. %u device has been updated and needs a reboot. %u devices have been updated and need a reboot. %u device is not the best known configuration. %u devices are not the best known configuration. %u device is supported in the enabled remotes (an update has been published) %u devices are supported in the enabled remotes (an update has been published) %u device is updatable %u devices are updatable %u hour %u hours %u minute %u minutes %u second %u seconds %u test was skipped %u tests were skipped %u%% (threshold %u%%) (obsoleted) A TPM PCR is now an invalid value AMD Firmware Replay Protection AMD Firmware Write Protection AMD Microcode Signature AMD Microcode Signature verification ensures that CPU microcode is authentic and has not been tampered with. AMD Platform Secure Boot AMD Secure Processor Rollback Protection AMD microcode signature AMD microcode signature vulnerability fixed ARCHIVE FIRMWARE METAINFO [FIRMWARE] [METAINFO] [JCATFILE] Action Required: Activate devices Activate pending devices Activate the new firmware on the device Activating firmware update Activating firmware update for Add a self-signed signature to a JCat file Add a signature to a JCat file Add an alias for a specific JCat item Adds devices to watch for future emulation Age Agree and enable the remote? Alias to %s All TPM PCRs are now valid All TPM PCRs are valid All devices are prevented from update by system inhibit All devices of the same type will be updated at the same time Allow downgrading firmware versions Allow reinstalling existing firmware versions Allow switching firmware branch Already exists, and no --force specified Alternate branch An update is in progress An update requires a reboot to complete. An update requires the system to shutdown to complete. Answer yes to all questions Apply update even when not advised Apply update files Applying update… Approved firmware: Approved firmware: Asks the daemon to quit Attach to firmware mode Authenticating… Authentication details are required Authentication is required to clear firmware update results Authentication is required to delete metadata from a remote Authentication is required to downgrade the firmware on a removable device Authentication is required to downgrade the firmware on this machine Authentication is required to enable emulation data collection Authentication is required to enable or disable a configured remote used for firmware updates Authentication is required to fix a host security issue Authentication is required to get the list of configured remotes used for firmware updates Authentication is required to install firmware on an emulated device Authentication is required to load hardware emulation data Authentication is required to modify BIOS settings Authentication is required to modify a configured remote used for firmware updates Authentication is required to modify a device property Authentication is required to modify daemon configuration Authentication is required to read BIOS settings Authentication is required to reset daemon configuration to defaults Authentication is required to save hardware emulation data Authentication is required to set the list of approved firmware Authentication is required to sign data using the client certificate Authentication is required to stop the firmware update service Authentication is required to switch to the new firmware version Authentication is required to undo the fix for a host security issue Authentication is required to unlock a device Authentication is required to update the firmware on a removable device Authentication is required to update the firmware on this machine Authentication is required to update the metadata for a configured remote used for firmware updates Authentication is required to update the stored checksums for the device Authentication is required to verify firmware on a device Automatic Reporting Automatically uninhibiting in %ums… Automatically upload every time? BIOS Firmware Updates BIOS Rollback Protection BIOS firmware updates BIOS rollback protection BIOS updates delivered via LVFS or Windows Update BUILDER-XML FILENAME-DST Battery Bind new kernel driver Blocked version Bootloader Version Branch Build a cabinet archive from a firmware blob and XML metadata Build a firmware file CET OS Support CET Platform CPU Microcode must be updated to mitigate against various information-disclosure security issues. CRC FILENAME Calculates a CRC of a file Can tag for emulation Cancel Cancelled Cannot apply as dbx update has already been applied. Changed Check if any devices are pending a reboot to complete update Checks cryptographic hash matches firmware Checksum Choose branch Choose device Choose firmware Choose release Choose volume Clean a configured remote Cleans a given remote Clear stored firmware update results Clears the results from the last update Command not found Community supported Compares two versions for equality Configuration Change Suggested Configuration is only readable by the system administrator Control-Flow Enforcement Technology detects and prevents certain methods for running malicious software on the device. Control-flow Enforcement Technology Convert a firmware file Create an EFI boot entry Created Critical Cryptographic hash verification is available Current Value Current version DEVICE-ID DEVICE-ID|GUID Debugging Options Decompressing… Delete an EFI boot entry Delete the now-unused remote cache files? Description Detach to bootloader mode Details Deviate from the best known configuration? Device Flags Device ID Device Requests Device added: Device already exists Device battery power is too low Device battery power is too low (%u%%, requires %u%%) Device can recover flash failures Device cannot be updated while the lid is closed Device changed: Device firmware has been locked Device firmware is required to have a version check Device is emulated Device is in use Device is locked Device is lower priority than an equivalent device Device is required to install all provided releases Device is unreachable Device is unreachable, or out of wireless range Device is usable for the duration of the update Device is waiting for the update to be applied Device list uploaded successfully, thanks! Device removed: Device requires AC power to be connected Device requires a display to be plugged in Device requires a software license to update Device software updates are provided for this device. Device stages updates Device supports switching to a different branch of firmware Device update needs activation Device will backup firmware before installing Device will not re-appear after update completes Devices that have been updated successfully: Devices that were not updated correctly: Devices with firmware updates that need user action: Devices with no available firmware updates: Devices with the latest available firmware version: Did not find any devices with matching GUIDs Disabled Disables a given remote Disables virtual testing devices Distribution Do not check for old metadata Do not check for unreported history Do not check if download remotes should be enabled Do not check or prompt for reboot after update Do not include log domain prefix Do not include timestamp prefix Do not perform device safety checks Do not prompt for devices Do not prompt to fix security issues Do not search the firmware when parsing Do not turn off your computer or remove the AC adaptor while the update is in progress. Do not write to the history database Do you understand the consequences of changing the firmware branch? Do you want to convert it now? Do you want to disable this feature for future updates? Do you want to refresh this remote now? Do you want to upload reports automatically for future updates? Don't prompt for authentication (less details may be shown) Done! Downgrade %s from %s to %s? Downgrades the firmware on a device Downgrading %s… Download a file Downloading… Dump SMBIOS data from a file Duration EMULATION-FILE [ARCHIVE-FILE] Each system should have tests to ensure firmware security. Emulate a device using a JSON manifest Emulated Emulated host Enable Enable an authenticated remote Enable emulation data collection Enable new remote? Enable this remote? Enabled Enabled if hardware matches Enables a given remote Enables virtual testing devices Enabling firmware updates for the BIOS allows fixing security issues. Enabling this functionality is done at your own risk, which means you have to contact your original equipment manufacturer regarding any problems caused by these updates. Only problems with the update process itself should be filed at $OS_RELEASE:BUG_REPORT_URL$. Enabling this remote is done at your own risk. Encrypted Encrypted RAM Encrypted RAM makes it impossible for information that is stored in device memory to be read if the memory chip is removed and accessed. End of life Enter your email address for remote '%s' Enter your token for remote '%s' Enumeration Erase all firmware update history Erasing… Exit after a small delay Exit after the engine has loaded Export a firmware file structure to XML Export firmware history for manual upload Exports all embedded signatures to files Extract a firmware blob to images FILE FILE [DEVICE-ID|GUID] FILENAME FILENAME CERTIFICATE PRIVATE-KEY FILENAME DATA DETACHED_KEY FILENAME DEVICE-ID [VERSION] FILENAME ID ALIAS_ID FILENAME OFFSET DATA [FIRMWARE-TYPE] FILENAME SOURCE CERT PRIVKEY [KIND[:VARIANT]] [TARGET] FILENAME SOURCE [KIND[:VARIANT]] [TARGET] FILENAME [DEVICE-ID|GUID] FILENAME [FIRMWARE-TYPE] FILENAME [KIND] FILENAME [SOURCE] FILENAME-SRC FILENAME-DST [FIRMWARE-TYPE-SRC] [FIRMWARE-TYPE-DST] FILENAME|CHECKSUM1[,CHECKSUM2][,CHECKSUM3] Failed Failed to apply update Failed to connect to Windows service, please ensure it's running. Failed to connect to daemon Failed to load context Failed to load local dbx Failed to load system dbx Failed to lock Failed to parse arguments Failed to parse flags for %s Failed to parse local dbx Failed to set front-end features Failed to validate ESP contents False Filename Filename Signature Filename Source Filename required Filter to specific protocols, e.g. '~org.uefi.capsule' or 'org.nvmexpress' Filter with a set of device flags using a ~ prefix to exclude, e.g. 'internal,~needs-reboot' Filter with a set of release flags using a ~ prefix to exclude, e.g. 'trusted-release,~trusted-metadata' Finds an algorithm that matches the file CRC Finds firmware releases from the metadata Firmware Attestation Firmware Attestation checks device software using a reference copy, to make sure that it has not been changed. Firmware BIOS Descriptor Firmware BIOS Descriptor protects device firmware memory from being tampered with. Firmware BIOS Region Firmware BIOS Region protects device firmware memory from being tampered with. Firmware Base URI Firmware Update D-Bus Service Firmware Update Daemon Firmware Updater Verification Firmware Updater Verification checks that software used for updating has not been tampered with. Firmware Updates Firmware Utility Firmware Write Protection Firmware Write Protection Lock Firmware Write Protection protects device firmware memory from being tampered with. Firmware attestation Firmware metadata has not been updated for %u day and may not be up to date. Firmware metadata has not been updated for %u days and may not be up to date. Firmware updates Firmware updates disabled; run '%s' to enable Fix a specific host security attribute Fix reverted successfully Fixed successfully Flags Force the action by relaxing some runtime checks Found Full Disk Encryption Detected Full disk encryption secrets may be invalidated when updating Fused Platform Fused platform GUID GUIDs GUID|DEVICE-ID Get BIOS settings Get all device flags supported by fwupd Get all devices that support firmware updates Get all enabled plugins registered with the system Get all known version formats Get configured remotes Get device report metadata Gets details about a firmware file Gets the configured remotes Gets the host security attributes Gets the list of approved firmware Gets the list of updates for all specified devices, or all devices if unspecified Gets the releases for a device Gets the results from the last update HP SureStart HP SureStart is a firmware security feature that protects the BIOS from tampering. HP SureStart is enabled HWIDS-FILE Hardware is waiting to be replugged High Host Security Events Host Security ID (HSI) is not supported Host Security ID attributes uploaded successfully, thanks! Host Security ID: INDEX INDEX KEY [VALUE] INDEX NAME TARGET [MOUNTPOINT] INDEX1,INDEX2 INHIBIT-ID IOMMU IOMMU Protection IOMMU Protection prevents connected devices from accessing unauthorized parts of system memory. IOMMU device protection disabled IOMMU device protection enabled Idle… Ignore SSL strict checks when downloading files Ignore firmware checksum failures Ignore firmware hardware mismatch failures Ignore non-critical firmware requirements Ignoring SSL strict checks, to do this automatically in the future export DISABLE_SSL_STRICT in your environment Image Image (custom) Inhibit ID is %s. Inhibit the system to prevent upgrades Install Duration Install a firmware file in cabinet format on this hardware Install a raw firmware blob on a device Install a specific firmware file on all devices that match Install a specific firmware on a device, all possible devices will also be installed once the CAB matches Install firmware on emulated device Install old version of signed system firmware Install old version of unsigned system firmware Install signed device firmware Install signed system firmware Install unsigned device firmware Install unsigned system firmware Installing a specific release is explicitly required Installing firmware update… Installing on %s… Installing this update may also void any device warranty. Integer Intel BootGuard Intel BootGuard ACM Protected Intel BootGuard ACM protected Intel BootGuard Error Policy Intel BootGuard Error Policy ensures the device does not continue to start if its device software has been tampered with. Intel BootGuard Fuse Intel BootGuard OTP fuse Intel BootGuard Verified Boot Intel BootGuard error policy Intel BootGuard prevents unauthorized device software from operating when the device is started. Intel BootGuard verified boot Intel GDS Mitigation Intel GDS mitigation Intel Management Engine Manufacturing Mode Intel Management Engine Override Intel Management Engine Override disables checks for device software tampering. Intel Management Engine Version Internal device Invalid Invalid arguments Invalid arguments, expected GUID Invalid arguments, expected INDEX KEY [VALUE] Invalid arguments, expected INDEX NAME TARGET [MOUNTPOINT] Invalid arguments, expected an AppStream ID Invalid arguments, expected at least ARCHIVE FIRMWARE METAINFO Invalid arguments, expected base-16 integer Is downgrade Is in bootloader mode Is upgrade Issue Issues KIND FILENAME Kernel is no longer tainted Kernel is tainted Kernel lockdown disabled Kernel lockdown enabled LOCATION Last modified Less than one minute remaining License Linux Kernel Lockdown Linux Kernel Lockdown mode prevents administrator (root) accounts from accessing and changing critical parts of system software. Linux Kernel Swap temporarily saves information to disk as you work. If the information is not protected, it could be accessed by someone if they obtained the disk. Linux Kernel Verification Linux Kernel Verification makes sure that critical system software has not been tampered with. Using device drivers which are not provided with the system can prevent this security feature from working correctly. Linux Swap Linux Vendor Firmware Service (stable firmware) Linux Vendor Firmware Service (testing firmware) Linux kernel Linux kernel lockdown Linux swap List EFI boot files List EFI boot parameters List EFI variables with a specific GUID List entries in dbx List the available firmware GTypes List the available firmware types Lists files on the ESP Load device emulation data Loaded from an external module Loading… Location of public key directories used for JCat verification Locked Low MEI Key Manifest MEI key manifest MEI manufacturing mode MEI override MEI version Manually enable specific plugins Manufacturing Mode is used when the device is manufactured and security features are not yet enabled. Maximum Version Maximum length Maximum value Medium Message Message (custom) Metadata Signature Metadata URI Metadata can be obtained from the Linux Vendor Firmware Service. Metadata is already up to date Metadata is up to date; use %s to refresh again. Minimum Version Minimum length Minimum value Modifies a daemon configuration value Modifies a given remote Modify a configured remote Modify a device property Modify daemon configuration Monitor the daemon for events Mounts the ESP Needs a reboot after installation Needs reboot Needs shutdown after installation New version No action specified! No devices are updatable No downgrades for %s No firmware IDs found No firmware found No hardware detected with firmware update capability No matching releases for search token No reboot is necessary No releases available No remotes are currently enabled so no metadata is available. No remotes available No updatable devices No updates available No updates available for remaining devices No volume matched %s Not approved Not found Not supported Nothing to do OK OK! Old version Only install onto emulated devices Only use peer-to-peer networking when downloading files Only version upgrades are allowed Output in JSON format (disables all interactive prompts) Override the default ESP path P2P Firmware P2P Metadata PATH Parse and show details about a firmware file Parse the system PCR eventlog Parsing dbx update… Parsing system dbx… Patch a firmware blob at a known offset Payload Pending Perform operation? Platform Debugging Platform Debugging allows device security features to be disabled. This should only be used by hardware manufacturers. Platform Secure Boot prevents unsigned software from being loaded when the device starts. Platform debugging Platform secure boot Please ensure you have the volume recovery key before continuing. Please enter a number from 0 to %u: Please enter either %s or %s: Plugin dependencies missing Plugin enumeration may change device state Plugin is only for testing Possible Values Pre-boot DMA Protection Pre-boot DMA protection Pre-boot DMA protection is disabled Pre-boot DMA protection is enabled Pre-boot DMA protection prevents devices from accessing system memory after being connected to the computer. Prefix for import and output files Press unlock on the device to continue the update process. Previous version Priority Problems Proceed with upload? Processor Security Checks Processor rollback protection Proprietary REMOTE-ID REMOTE-ID KEY VALUE Read Only Read a firmware blob from a device Read a firmware from a device Reading from %s… Reading… Ready Reboot to complete the update. Refresh Interval Refresh metadata from remote server Reinstall %s to %s? Reinstall current firmware on the device Reinstall firmware on a device Release Branch Release Flags Release ID Remote ID Remote enabled and refreshed successfully Remove an alias for a specific JCat item Removes devices to watch for future emulation Report URI Reported to remote server Required efivarfs filesystem was not found Required hardware was not found Requires Auth Requires a bootloader Requires internet connection Reset daemon configuration Resets a daemon configuration section Restart now? Restart the daemon to make the change effective? Restarting device… Retrieve BIOS settings. If no arguments are passed all settings are returned Return all the hardware IDs for the machine Review and upload report now? Rollback Protection prevents device software from being downgraded to an older version that has security problems. Run `%s` for more information. Run `%s` to complete this action. Run the plugin composite cleanup routine when using install-blob Run the plugin composite prepare routine when using install-blob Run the post-reboot cleanup action Run without '%s' to see Running kernel is too old Runtime Suffix SBOM SECTION SETTING VALUE SETTING1 VALUE1 [SETTING2] [VALUE2] SMAP SMM locked down SPI BIOS Descriptor SPI BIOS region SPI lock SPI replay protection SPI write SPI write protection SUBSYSTEM DRIVER [DEVICE-ID|GUID] Save a file that allows generation of hardware IDs Save device emulation data Saved report Scalar Increment Scheduling… Secure Boot disabled Secure Boot enabled Security hardening for HSI See %s for more details. See %s for more information. Selected device Selected volume Serial Number Set BIOS setting '%s' using '%s'. Set a BIOS setting Set one or more BIOS settings Set or remove an EFI boot hive entry Set the EFI boot next Set the EFI boot order Set the download retries for transient errors Sets one or more BIOS settings Sets the list of approved firmware Setting type Settings will apply after system reboots Share firmware history with the developers Show all results Show client and daemon versions Show daemon verbose information for a particular domain Show debugging information for all domains Show debugging options Show devices that are not updatable Show extra debugging information Show history of firmware updates Show information about a JCat file Show the calculated version of the dbx Shutdown now? Sign a firmware with a new key Sign data using the client certificate Sign the uploaded data with the client certificate Signature Signed Payload Size Some of the platform secrets may be invalidated when updating this firmware. Source Specify the dbx database file Stop the fwupd service String Success Successfully activated all devices Successfully cleaned remote Successfully disabled remote Successfully disabled test devices Successfully downloaded new metadata: Successfully enabled and refreshed remote Successfully enabled remote Successfully enabled test devices Successfully installed firmware Successfully modified configuration value Successfully modified remote Successfully refreshed metadata manually Successfully reset configuration section Successfully reset configuration values Successfully updated device checksums Successfully uploaded %u report Successfully uploaded %u reports Successfully verified device checksums Successfully waited %.0fms for device Summary Supervisor Mode Access Prevention Supervisor Mode Access Prevention ensures critical parts of device memory are not accessed by less secure programs. Supported Supported CPU Supported on remote server Suspend To Idle Suspend To RAM Suspend to Idle allows the device to quickly go to sleep in order to save power. While the device has been suspended, its memory could be physically removed and its information accessed. Suspend to RAM allows the device to quickly go to sleep in order to save power. While the device has been suspended, its memory could be physically removed and its information accessed. Suspend-to-idle Suspend-to-ram Switch branch from %s to %s? Switch the firmware branch on the device Sync firmware versions to the chosen configuration System Management Mode System Update Inhibited System has been signed with an insecure key System management mode is used by the firmware to access resident BIOS code and data. System power is too low System power is too low (%u%%, requires %u%%) System requires external power source TEXT TPM (Trusted Platform Module) is a computer chip that detects when hardware components have been tampered with. TPM PCR0 reconstruction TPM PCR0 reconstruction is invalid TPM PCR0 reconstruction is now valid TPM Platform Configuration TPM Reconstruction TPM empty PCRs TPM v2.0 Tag Tags Tagged for emulation Tainted Target Test a device using a JSON manifest Tested Tested by %s Tested by trusted vendor The EFI boot entry is not in hive format, and shim may not be new enough to read it. The EFI boot entry was not in hive format, falling back The Intel Management Engine Key Manifest must be valid so that the device firmware can be trusted by the CPU. The Intel Management Engine controls device components and needs to have a recent version to avoid security issues. The LVFS is a free service that operates as an independent legal entity and has no connection with $OS_RELEASE:NAME$. Your distributor may not have verified any of the firmware updates for compatibility with your system or connected devices. All firmware is provided only by the original equipment manufacturer. The TPM (Trusted Platform Module) Platform Configuration is used to check whether the device start process has been modified. The TPM (Trusted Platform Module) Reconstruction is used to check whether the device start process has been modified. The TPM PCR0 differs from reconstruction. The UEFI Platform Key is used to determine if device software comes from a trusted source. The UEFI bootloader compiled with Data Execution Prevention support. The UEFI certificate store is now up to date The UEFI db contains the list of valid certificates that can be used to authorize what EFI binaries are allowed to run. The UEFI system can set up memory attributes at boot which prevent common exploits from running. The daemon has loaded 3rd party code and is no longer supported by the upstream developers! The firmware from %s is not supplied by %s, the hardware vendor. The system clock has not been set correctly and downloading files may fail. The update will continue when the device USB cable has been re-inserted. The update will continue when the device USB cable has been unplugged and then re-inserted. The update will continue when the device USB cable has been unplugged. The update will continue when the device power cable has been removed and re-inserted. The vendor did not supply any release notes. There are devices with issues: There is no approved firmware. This device will be reverted back to %s when the %s command is performed. This firmware is provided by LVFS community members and is not provided (or supported) by the original hardware vendor. This package has not been validated, it may not work properly. This program may only work correctly as root This remote contains firmware which is not embargoed, but is still being tested by the hardware vendor. You should ensure you have a way to manually downgrade the firmware if the firmware update fails. This system doesn't support firmware settings This system has HSI runtime issues. This system has a low HSI security level. This tool allows an administrator to apply UEFI dbx updates. This tool allows an administrator to query and control the fwupd daemon, allowing them to perform actions such as installing or downgrading firmware. This tool allows an administrator to use the fwupd plugins without being installed on the host system. This tool can add a kernel argument of '%s', but it will only be active after restarting the computer. This tool can change the BIOS setting '%s' from '%s' to '%s' automatically, but it will only be active after restarting the computer. This tool can change the kernel argument from '%s' to '%s', but it will only be active after restarting the computer. To get a new token please go to %s and click 'Generate Token' Token Transient failure True Trusted metadata Trusted payload Type UEFI Bootservice Variables UEFI ESP partition may not be set up correctly UEFI ESP partition not detected or configured UEFI Memory Protection UEFI NX Protection UEFI NX bootloader protection is now disabled UEFI NX bootloader protection is now enabled UEFI NX protection UEFI Platform Key UEFI Secure Boot UEFI Secure Boot prevents malicious software from being loaded when the device starts. UEFI boot service variables should not be readable from runtime mode. UEFI bootservice variables UEFI capsule updates not available or enabled in firmware setup UEFI db UEFI dbx Utility UEFI firmware can not be updated in legacy BIOS mode UEFI memory protection UEFI memory protection is now locked UEFI memory protection is now unlocked UEFI platform key UEFI secure boot URL Unable to connect to service Unable to find attribute Unbind current driver Undo the host security attribute fix Unencrypted Uninhibit the system to allow upgrades Unknown Unknown Device Unlock the device to allow access Unlocked Unlocks the device for firmware access Unmounts the ESP Unplug and replug the device to continue the update process. Unsigned Payload Unsupported daemon version %s, client version is %s Untainted Updatable Update Error Update Image Update Message Update State Update failure is a known issue, visit this URL for more information: Update now? Update the metadata for a configured remote Update the stored cryptographic hash with current ROM contents Update the stored device verification information Update the stored metadata with current contents Updates all specified devices to latest firmware version, or all devices if unspecified Updating Updating %s… Upgrade %s from %s to %s? Upload data now? Upload the list of updatable devices to a remote server Upload these anonymous results to the %s to help other users? Uploading a device list allows the %s team to know what hardware exists, and allows us to put pressure on vendors that do not upload firmware updates for their hardware. Uploading firmware reports helps hardware vendors to quickly identify failing and successful updates on real devices. Urgency Use %s for help Use CTRL^C to cancel. User has been notified Username VERSION1 VERSION2 [FORMAT] Valid Validating ESP contents… Variant Vendor Verify a signature from a JCat file Verify device firmware Verifying… Version Version[fwupd] WARNING WORD Wait for a device to appear Waiting… Watch for hardware changes Will measure elements of system integrity around an update Writing file: Writing… You should ensure you are comfortable restoring the setting from a recovery or installation disk, as this change may cause the system to not boot into Linux or cause other system instability. You should ensure you are comfortable restoring the setting from the system firmware setup, as this change may cause the system to not boot into Linux or cause other system instability. Your distributor may not have verified any of the firmware updates for compatibility with your system or connected devices. Your hardware may be damaged using this firmware, and installing this release may void any warranty with %s. Your system is set up to the BKC of %s. [APPSTREAM_ID] [DEVICE-ID|GUID] [DEVICE-ID|GUID] [BRANCH] [DEVICE-ID|GUID] [VERSION] [DEVICE] [FILE FILE_SIG REMOTE-ID] [FILENAME1] [FILENAME2] [FWUPD-VERSION] [PCR] [REASON] [TIMEOUT] [REMOTE-ID] [USERNAME] [TOKEN] [SECTION] KEY VALUE [SETTING1] [SETTING2] [--no-authenticate] [SETTING1] [SETTING2]… [SMBIOS-FILE|HWIDS-FILE] command-argumentGUID command-descriptionSign data using the client certificate coreboot Verified Boot coreboot verified boot coreboot verified boot prevents unsigned firmware from being loaded when the device starts. default fwupd plugins Project-Id-Version: fwupd Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: POT-Creation-Date: 2026-06-23 19:18+0100 PO-Revision-Date: 2026-06-26 16:01+0000 Last-Translator: Hosted Weblate user 54392 <hamburger2048@users.noreply.hosted.weblate.org> Language-Team: Chinese (Simplified Han script) <https://hosted.weblate.org/projects/fwupd/fwupd/zh_Hans/> Language: zh_CN MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Plural-Forms: nplurals=1; plural=0; X-Generator: Weblate 2026.7.dev0 还剩 %.0f 分钟 %s BMC 更新 %s 电池更新 %s CPU 微码更新 %s 摄像头更新 %s 配置更新 %s 消费者 ME 更新 %s 控制器更新 %s 企业 ME 更新 %s 设备更新 %s 显示器更新 %s 坞更新 %s 驱动关系 %s 嵌入式控制器更新 %s 指纹读取器更新 %s 闪存盘更新 %s GPU 更新 %s 绘图板更新 %s 耳机更新 %s 头戴式耳机更新 %s 输入控制器更新 %s 键盘更新 %s 管理引擎（ME）更新 %s 鼠标更新 %s 网络接口更新 %s SSD 更新 %s 存储控制器更新 %s 系统更新 %s TPM 更新 %s Thunderbolt 控制器更新 %s 触摸板更新 %s 触摸屏更新 %s USB 坞更新 %s USB 接收器更新 %s 更新 更新期间 %s 和所有连接的设备可能无法使用。 %s 出现了：%s %s 改变了：%s → %s %s 消失了：%s %s 当前不可更新： %s 待激活；用 %s 完成更新。 %s 生产模式 更新期间必须保持 %s 的连接以避免损坏。 更新期间必须保持 %s 接入电源以避免损坏。 %s 覆写 %s v%s %s 版本 %u 天 %u 个设备有可升级的固件。 %u 台设备已更新，需要重启。 %u 台设备不是最佳的已知配置。 已启用的远程源支持 %u 台设备（已发布一个更新） %u 台设备可更新 %u 小时 %u 分钟 %u 秒 跳过了 %u 个测试 %u%% (阈值 %u%%) （已过时） TPM PCR 现在是无效值 AMD 固件重放保护 AMD 固件写入保护 AMD 微代码签名 AMD 微代码签名验证确保 CPU 微代码可信未遭篡改。 AMD Platform 安全启动 AMD 安全处理器回滚保护 AMD 微代码签名 修复了 AMD 微代码签名漏洞 ARCHIVE FIRMWARE METAINFO [FIRMWARE] [METAINFO] [JCATFILE] 所需操作： 激活设备 激活待处理的设备 激活设备上的新固件 正在激活固件更新 正在激活固件更新给 添加自签署签名到 JCat 文件 添加签名到 JCat 文件 为特定 JCat 项目添加别名 添加要留意未来仿真的设备 已发布时间 同意并启用此远程源吗？ %s 的别名 所有 TPM PCR 均有效 所有 TPM PCR 均有效 所有设备更新均被系统抑制阻止 所有相同类型的设备会在相同一时间更新 允许降级固件版本 允许重新安装现有的固件版本 允许切换固件分支 已存在，未指定 --force 替代分支 正在更新 更新需要重启设备才能完成。 更新需要系统关机才能完成。 一律用“是”回答问题 应用更新，即使不建议 应用更新文件 正在应用更新…… 批准的固件： 请求 daemon 退出 附加到固件模式 正在认证… 需要身份验证详细信息 清除固件更新结果需要认证身份 从远程源删除元数据需要进行身份认证 需要认证：在可移动设备上降级固件 需要认证：在此机器上降级固件 需要身份认证开启仿真数据收集 启用或禁用用来更新固件的已配置的远端需要身份认证 需要身份认证来修复主机安全问题 获得用于更新固件的配置好的远端地址列表需要认证身份 在仿真设备上安装固件要认证身份 需要身份认证来加载硬件仿真数据 需要身份认证来修改 BIOS 设置 需要认证：修改用于固件更新的已配置远程源 修改设备属性要认证身份 需要认证：修改daemon配置 需要身份认证来读取 BIOS 设置 需要身份认证来重置 daemon 配置到默认值 需要身份认证来保存硬件仿真数据 需要认证：设定批准固件的列表 需要认证：使用客户端证书签名数据 需要身份认证来停止固件更新服务 需要认证：切换到新固件版本 需要身份认证来撤销主机安全问题的修复 需要认证：解锁设备 需要认证：在可移动设备上升级固件 需要认证：在此机器上升级固件 更新用来固件更新的已配置的远端需身份认证 需要认证：为设备更新存储的校验和 验证设备上的固件需认证身份 自动报告 %u 毫秒后自动取消抑制… 每次都自动上传？ BIOS 固件更新 BIOS 回滚保护 BIOS 固件更新 BIOS 回滚保护 BIOS 更新通过 LVFS 或 Windows Update 提供 生成器XML 目标文件名 电池 绑定新内核驱动 被拦截的版本 引导程序版本 分支 从固件 blob 和 XML 元数据构建 cab 格式压缩包 生成固件文件 操作系统 CET 支持 CET Platform 必须更新 CPU 微代码来缓解多个信息披露安全问题。 CRC FILENAME 计算文件 CRC 可打上仿真标签 取消 已取消 无法应用 dbx 更新因其更新已应用。 已变更 监察是否有设备待重启完成更新 检查加密哈希与固件是否匹配 校验和 选择分支 选择设备 选择固件 选择发布版本 选择卷 清理已配置的远端设备 清理给定的远程源 清除存储的固件更新结果 清除从最后一次更新获取的结果 未找到命令 社区支持 比较两个版本是否相等 配置变更建议 只有系统管理员可读取配置 控制流强制技术检测并阻止某些在设备上运行恶意软件的方法。 控制流强制技术 转换固件文件 创建 EFI 启动项 创建日期 关键 支持加密哈希验证 当前值 当前版本 DEVICE-ID 设备ID|GUID 调试选项 正在解压缩… 删除 EFI 启动项 删除现在不用的远程缓存文件？ 描述 拆离到引导加载器模式 详情 偏离最佳已知配制？ 设备标志 设备 ID 设备请求 已添加设备： 设备已存在 设备电量过低 设备电量过低 （%u%%, 要求 %u%%） 设备可从刷机失败恢复 盖板关闭时无法更新设备 已更改设备： 设备固件已被锁定 设备固件需要版本检查 仿真设备 设备使用中 设备已锁定 设备优先级低于相同设备 设备需要安装所有提供的版本 设备不可访问 设置不可达或在无线网络范围以外 设备在更新期间可使用 设备在等待应用更新 成功上传了设备列表，谢谢！ 已移除设备： 设备需连接直流电源 设备需要插入显示器 设备需要软件许可证才能更新 为此设备提供设备软件更新。 设备阶段更新 设备支持切换到不同的固件分支 设备更新需要激活 设备将在安装前备份固件 更新完后设备不会再显示 成功更新的设备： 未正确更新的设备： 有需要用户操作的固件更新的设备： 固件更新不可用的设备： 固件已是最新的设备： 未找到任何匹配 GUID 的设备 已禁用 禁用给定的远程源 禁用虚拟测试设备 发行版 不要查找老的元数据 不要查找未报告历史 不要检查下载远程是否已启用 更新后不要检查或提示是否要重启 不包含日志域前缀 不包含时间戳前缀 不要执行设备安全检查 不提示设备 不提示修复安全问题 解析时不搜索固件 更新进行时不要关闭计算机或删除直流适配器。 不要写入历史数据库 你清楚更改固件分支的后果吗？ 要立即转换它吗？ 你要在将来的更新中禁用此功能吗？ 你要现在刷新这个远程库吗？ 你要将来的更新中自动上传报告吗？ 不提示身份认证（可能不显示详情） 完成！ 降级 %s，从 %s 到 %s？ 降级设备上的固件 正在下载 %s…… 下载文件 正在下载… 从文件转储 SMBIOS 数据 时长 EMULATION-FILE [ARCHIVE-FILE] 每个系统应该进行测试确保固件安全性。 用 JSON 清单模拟设备 仿真的 仿真主机 启用 启用经身份认证的远端 开启仿真数据收集 启用新的远程库？ 要启用此远程源吗？ 已启用 如设备匹配则开启 启用给定的远程源 启用虚拟测试设备 启用 BIOS 固件更新允许修复安全问题。 启用此功能的风险自负，这意味着你必须就这些更新引起的任何问题与原始设备制造商联系。只有更新过程本身的问题可以提交到 $OS_RELEASE:BUG_REPORT_URL$。 启用此远程源后果自负。 已加密 加密内存 加密的 RAM 作用是如果内存芯片被移除并进行访问，则存储在设备上的信息不可能被读取。 支持终止 输入远端 “%s” 的电子邮箱地址 输入远端 "%s" 的令牌 枚举 清除所有固件更新历史 正在擦除… 在短暂的延迟后退出 在引擎加载后退出 导出 XML 结构的固件文件 导出固件历史用于手动上传 将所有内嵌的签名导出到文件 提取固件比特块到映像 文件 文件 [设备ID|GUID] 文件名 文件名称 证书 私钥 FILENAME DATA DETACHED_KEY FILENAME DEVICE-ID [VERSION] FILENAME ID ALIAS_ID FILENAME OFFSET DATA [FIRMWARE-TYPE] FILENAME SOURCE CERT PRIVKEY [KIND[:VARIANT]] [TARGET] FILENAME SOURCE [KIND[:VARIANT]] [TARGET] 文件名 [设备ID|GUID] 文件名 [固件类型] FILENAME [KIND] FILENAME [SOURCE] 源文件名 目标文件名 [源固件类型] [目标固件类型] FILENAME|CHECKSUM1[,CHECKSUM2][,CHECKSUM3] 已失败 应用更新失败 连接 Windows 服务失败，请确保它正在运行。 连接到daemon失败 加载上下文失败 加载本地 dbx 失败 加载系统 dbx 失败 锁定失败 未能解析参数 解析 %s 标记失败 解析本地 dbx 失败 设置前端功能失败 验证 ESP 内容失败 False 文件名 文件名签名 文件来源 需要文件名 特定协议筛选器，如 '~org.uefi.capsule' 或 'org.nvmexpress' 筛选器为一组设备标志，使用 ~ 前缀来排除设备，示例 "internal,~needs-reboot" 含一组发行标记的筛选器，~ 前缀表示排除，如 'trusted-release,~trusted-metadata' 需按照匹配文件 CRC 的算法 从元数据需按照固件发行版 固件验证 固件验证使用参照副本检查设备软件确保固件没有被更改。 固件 BIOS 描述符 固件 BIOS 描述符保护设备固件内存免遭篡改。 固件 BIOS 区域 固件 BIOS 区域保护设备固件内存免遭篡改。 固件库 URI 固件更新 D-Bus 服务 固件更新守护程序 固件更新器验证 固件更新器验证检查用于更新的软件未遭篡改。 固件更新 固件实用程序 固件写保护 固件写保护锁 固件写入保护技术保护设备固件内存免于篡改。 固件证明 固件元数据已有 %u 天未更新，数据可能不是最新的。 固件更新 固件更新被禁用；运行 '%s' 开启 修复特定的主机安全属性 成功撤销了修复 成功修复 标志 通过放宽一些运行时检查来强制操作 找到 探测到全盘加密 更新时全盘加密 secret 可能失效 Fused Platform Fused 平台 GUID GUID|DEVICE-ID 获取 BIOS 设置 获取 fwupd 支持的全部设备标志 获得所有支持更新固件的硬件列表 获取所有在系统注册的启用插件 获取所有已知版本格式 获取配置的远端 获取设备报告元数据 获取有关某固件文件的详细信息 获取已配置的远程源 获取主机安全属性 获取已批准固件的列表 获取所有指定设备的更新列表，如未指定则获取所有设备的更新列表 获取用于设备的发行版本 从最后一次更新中获取结果 HP SureStart HP SureStart 是保护 BIOS 免遭篡改的固件安全特性。 HP SureStart 已启用 HWIDS文件 硬件正等待重新插入 高 主机安全事件 不支持主机安全 ID (HSI) 成功上传主机安全 ID 属性，谢谢！ 主机安全 ID： INDEX INDEX KEY [VALUE] INDEX NAME TARGET [MOUNTPOINT] INDEX1,INDEX2 INHIBIT-ID IOMMU IOMMU 保护 IOMMU 保护阻止已连接设备访问系统内存未经授权的部分。 IOMMU 设备保护已禁用 IOMMU 设备保护已启用 空闲… 下载文件时忽略 SSL 严格检查 忽略固件校验和错误 忽略固件硬件不匹配错误 忽略非关键固件要求 正在忽略 SSL 严格检查，要在之后自动应用这一选项请在你的环境里 export DISABLE_SSL_STRICT 图片 图片（自定义） Inhibit ID 是 %s. 抑制系统阻止升级 安装时长 在此硬件上安装 cab 格式的固件文件 在设备上安装原始固件 blob 在所有匹配的设备上安装特定的固件文件 在设备上安装特定固件，一旦 CAB 匹配所有可能的设备也会被安装 在仿真设备上安装固件 安装旧版本的已签名系统固件 安装旧版本的未签名系统固件 安装已签名的设备固件 安装已签名的系统固件 安装未签名的设备固件 安装未签名的系统固件 明确要求安装特定发行版本 正在安装固件更新… 正在安装到 %s…… 安装此更新还可能破坏任何设备保修。 整数 Intel BootGuard Intel BootGuard ACM 受保护 Intel BootGuard ACM 保护 Intel BootGuard 错误策略 Intel BootGuard 错误策略确保如果设备软件已遭篡改，则设备不会继续启动。 Intel BootGuard Fuse Intel BootGuard OTP 保险丝 Intel BootGuard 验证启动 Intel BootGuard 错误策略 Intel BootGuard 阻止未经授权的设备软件在设备启动时运行。 Intel BootGuard 验任启动 Intel GDS 缓解 Intel GDS 缓解 Intel ME 制造模式 Intel ME 引擎覆盖 Intel ME 引擎覆盖禁用设备软件篡改检查。 Intel ME 版本 内部设备 无效 无效变量 无效变量，预期的是 GUID 无效变量，预期的是 INDEX KEY [VALUE] 无效变量，预期的是 INDEX NAME TARGET [MOUNTPOINT] 无效变量，预期的是一个 AppStream ID 无效变量，预期至少是 ARCHIVE FIRMWARE METAINFO 无效变量，预期的是 base-16 整数 版本较低 处于引导程序模式 版本较新 问题 KIND FILENAME 内核不再受污染 内核被污染 禁用了内核锁定 启用了内核锁定 位置 最后修改 还剩不到一分钟 许可证 Linux 内核锁定 Linux 内核锁定模式阻止管理员 (root) 账户访问并更改系统软件的关键部分。 Linux 内核 Swap 在你工作时临时将信息保存到磁盘。如果信息未受保护，它可能被某人访问，假如这个人获得了磁盘。 Linux 内核验证 Linux 内核验证确保关键系统软件未遭篡改。适应不随系统提供的设备驱动可能阻止此安全特性正常工作。 Linux Swap Linux 供应商固件服务（稳定固件） Linux 供应商固件服务（测试固件） Linux 内核 Linux 内核锁定 Linux 交换区 列出 EFI 启动文件 列出 EFI 启动参数 列出特定 GUID 的 EFI 变量 列出 dbx 中的条目 列出可用的固件 GTypes 列出可用的固件类型 列出 ESP 分区中的文件 加载设备仿真数据 从外部模块加载 正在加载… 用于验证 JCat 的公钥目录的位置 已锁定 低 MEI Key 清单 MEI key 清单 MEI 生产模式 MEI 覆写 MEI 版本 手动启用指定插件 制造模式在制造设备和安全特性尚未启用时使用。 最高版本 最大长度 最大值 中 消息 消息（自定义） 元数据签名 元数据 URI 可从 Linux 供应商固件服务获取元数据。 元数据已是最新 元数据是最新；使用 %s 再次刷新。 最小版本 最小长度 最小值 修改daemon的配置值 修改给定的远程源 修改已配置的远程源 修改设备属性 修改daemon配置 监视守护程序里的事件 挂载 ESP 分区 安装完后需要重启 需要重启 安装完后需要关机 新版本 未指定操作！ 无设备可更新 %s 无可用降级 未找到固件 ID 未找到固件 没有检测到支持更新固件的硬件 搜索令牌没有匹配的发布版本 无需重启 无可用发布版本 当前尚未启用任何远程源，因此无可用元数据。 无可用远程源 无可更新设备 无更新可用 其余设备没有可用更新 没有卷匹配 %s 未批准 未找到 未支持 无可安装更新 确定 好！ 旧版本 只安装进仿真设备 下载文件时只用点到点传输 只允许版本升级 JSON 格式的输出（禁用全部互动提示） 覆盖默认的 ESP 路径 P2P 固件 P2P 元数据 路径 解析并显示固件文件的详细信息 解析系统 PCR 事件日志 正在解析 dbx 更新…… 正在解析系统 dbx…… 在已知偏移量处对固件二进制文件打补丁 载荷 待处理 执行操作？ Platform 调试 Platform 调试禁用设备安全特性。这应只由硬件制造商使用。 TPM 安全启动阻止未签名软件在设备启动时被加载。 Platform调试 Platform安全启动 继续前确保有卷恢复密钥。 请输入一个 0 到 %u 的数字： 请输入 %s 或 %s： 插件依赖缺失 插件枚举可能改变设备状态 插件仅用于测试 可能值 启动前 DMA 保护 预启动 DMA 保护 禁用了启动前DMA 保护 开启了启动前 DMA 保护 启动前 DMA 保护防止设备在被连接到计算机后访问系统内存。 导入和导出文件的前缀 在设备上按解锁继续更新过程。 上个版本 优先级 问题 确定要上传吗？ 处理器安全检查 处理器回滚保护 私有 远程ID 远程ID 键 值 只读 从设备读取固件比特块（blob） 从设备读取固件 正在读取 %s…… 正在读取… 就绪 重启完成更新。 刷新间隔 刷新来自远程服务器的元数据 重新安装 %s 到 %s？ 在设备上重新安装当前的固件 重新安装设备上的固件 发行分支 发行标记 发行版本 ID 远程源 ID 成功启用并刷新了远端 删除特定 JCat 项目的别名 删除要留意未来仿真的设备 报告 URI 已报告到远程服务器 所需 efivarfs 文件系统未找到 所需设备未找到 需要身份认证 需要引导程序 需要互联网连接 重置 daemon 配置 重置 daemon 配置部分 要现在重启设备吗？ 重启daemon以让更改生效？ 正在重启设备… 获取 BIOS 设置。 如未传递变量则返回所有设置 返回机器的所有硬件 ID 立即审核并上传报告吗？ 回滚保护阻止设备软件被降级到又安全问题的较老版本。 运行 `%s` 获取更多信息。 运行 `%s` 完成此操作。 当使用安装比特块时运行插件组合清理例程 当使用安装比特块时运行插件组合准备例程 运行重启后清理选项 没有 '%s' 情况下运行以查看 运行的内核太老旧 运行时后缀 软件物料清单 SECTION SETTING VALUE SETTING1 VALUE1 [SETTING2] [VALUE2] SMAP SMM 锁定 SPI BIOS 描述符 SPI BIOS 区域 SPI 锁 SPI 重放保护 SPI 写入 SPI 写入保护 子系统 驱动 [设备ID|GUID] 保存允许生成硬件 ID 的文件 保存设备仿真数据 保存了报告 纯量递增 正在计划… 安全启动已禁用 安全启动已启用 HSI 安全加固 更多细节见 %s。 查看 %s 获取更多信息。 所选设备 所选卷 序列号 设置 BIOS 设置 '%s'，通过 '%s'。 设置 BIOS 设置 设置一个或多个 BIOS 设置 设置或删除 EFI 启动项 接下来设置 EFI 启动 设置 EFI 启动顺序 设置短暂错误的下载重试次数 设置一个或多个 BIOS 设置 设定批准固件的列表 设置类型 设置将在系统重启后生效 与开发者分享固件历史 显示所有结果 显示客户端及守护程序版本 显示特定域的daemon详细信息 显示所有域的调试信息 显示调试选项 显示不可更新的设备 显示额外调试信息 显示固件更新历史 显示 JCat 文件信息 显示 dbx 的计算版本 现在关机？ 用新密钥签名固件 使用客户端证书签名数据 以客户端证书签名上传的数据 签名 有签名的载荷 大小 更新此固件时一些 Platform secret 可能失效了。 来源 指定 dbx 数据库文件 停止 fwupd 服务 字符串 成功 激活所有设备成功 成功清除了远程源 禁用远程源成功 成功禁用了测试设备 成功下载了新元数据： 已成功启用和刷新远程库 启用远程源成功 成功启用了测试设备 安装固件成功 修改配置值成功 修改远程源成功 手动刷新元数据成功 成功重置了配置部分 成功重置了配置值 更新设备校验和成功 上传 %u 篇报告成功 验证设备校验和成功 成功等待设备 %.0f 毫秒 概览 管理模式访问保护 管理者模式访问阻止确保设备内存关键部分不被不安全程序访问。 已支持 支持的 CPU 支持于远程服务器 挂起到空闲状态 挂起到 RAM 挂起到空闲允许设备快递进入睡眠以节电。虽然设备已被刮起，但可以用物理方式移除其内存，访问其信息。 挂起到 RAM 允许设备快速进入睡眠以节电。虽然设备已挂起，但可以用物理方式移除其内存条，访问其信息。 挂起到空闲 挂起到 RAM 切换分支，从 %s 到 %s？ 切换设备的固件分支 同步固件版本至选定的配置 系统管理模式 系统更新被抑制 系统由不安全密钥签名 固件使用系统管理模式来访问常驻 BIOS 代码和数据。 系统电量过低 系统电量过低 （%u%%, 要求 %u%%） 系统需要外接电源 文本 TPM （可信平台模块）是检测硬件组件何时被篡改的计算机芯片。 TPM PCR0 重建 TPM PCR0 重建无效 TPM PCR0 重建现在有效 TPM Platform 配置 TPM 重建 TPM 空 PCR TPM v2.0 标签 仿真标签 受污染 目标 使用 JSON 清单测试设备 已测试 由 %s 测试 由可信厂商测试 EFI 启动条目不是 hive 格式，shim 可能不够新无法读取它。 EFI 启动条目不是 hive 格式，正在回退 Intel ME 引擎 Key 清单必须有效，以使设备固件可被 CPU 信任。 Intel ME 引擎控制设备组件，需要有最近版本避免安全问题。 LVFS 是个免费服务，以独立法律实体运作，与 $OS_RELEASE:NAME$ 无关。你的发行商可能未对固件更新与你的系统或连接的设备兼容性做过任何验证。所有固件都由原始设备制造商提供。 TPM（可信平台模块） Platform 配置用于检查设备启动过程是否被修改。 TPM（可信平台模块）重建用于检查设备启动进程是否已被修改。 TPM PCR0 跟重建的不同。 UEFI Platform Key 用于确定设备软件是否来自可信源。 已编译的 UEFI 引导加载程序，支持数据执行保护。 UEFI 证书存储现已是最新 UEFI 数据库包含有效证书的列表，可用于授权允许运行的 EFI 二进制文件。 UEFI 系统可以在启动时设置内存属性，阻止常见漏洞运行。 daemon已经加载了第三方代码，并且上游开发者不再支持！ 来源 %s 的固件并非由硬件供应商 %s 提供。 系统时钟没有设置正确，文件下载可能会失败。 当 USB 连接线被重新插入时更新会继续。 当设备 USB 连接线被拔出并重新插入时，更新会继续。 当USB 连接线被拔出更新会继续。 当设备电源线被移除并重新插入时更新会继续。 厂商未提供任何更新日志。 存在有问题的设备： 没有批准的固件。 此设备将被恢复到 %s，当执行 %s 命令时。 此固件由 LVFS 社区成员提供，不是由 （或受）原始硬件厂商提供（或支持）。 此软件包未经验证，可能无法正常工作。 此程序只能以 root 身份正常运行 此远程源包含未禁止的固件，但其仍经过硬件供应商测试。你应该确保如果固件更新失败时你能够降级固件。 此系统不支持固件设置 该系统的 HSI 运行时有问题。 该系统的 HSI 安全级别较低。 此工具允许管理员应用 UEFI dbx 更新。 此工具允许管理员查询和控制 fwupd daemon，让其执行如安装或者降级固件等操作。 此工具可以让管理员不用安装 fwupd 插件到主机系统上就可以使用它们。 本工具可以添加 '%s' 的内核变量，但必须重启计算机才能生效。 此工具可自动将 BIOS 设置 '%s' 从 '%s' 改为 '%s'，但只有在重启计算机后才能生效。 本工具可将内核变量从 '%s' 改为 '%s'，但必须重启计算机才能生效。 要获得新的令牌，请转到 %s 并单击”生成了令牌” 令牌 暂时失败 True 可信元数据 可信载荷 类型 UEFI Bootservice 变量 可能未正确设置 UEFI ESP 分区 UEFI ESP 分区未检测到或未配置 UEFI 内存保护 UEFI NX 保护 已禁用 UEFI 启动引导保护 已启用 UEFI NX 启动引导 UEFI NX 保护 UEFI Platform Key UEFI 安全启动 UEFI 安全启动阻止恶意软件在设备启动时加载。 UEFI 启动服务变量在运行时模式下不应可读。 UEFI bootservice 变量 UEFI 胶囊更新在固件设置中不可用或未启用 UEFI 数据库 UEFI dbx 实用工具 UEFI 固件无法在传统 BIOS 模式下更新 UEFI 内存保护 UEFI 内存保护现已锁定 UEFI 内存保护现已解锁 UEFI Platform密钥 UEFI 安全引导 URL 无法连接到服务 无法找到属性 解除当前驱动的绑定 撤销主机安全属性修复 未加密 升级 未知 未知设备 解锁设备以允许访问 已解锁 为固件访问解锁设备 卸载 ESP 分区 拔出并重插设备来继续更新过程。 无签名的载荷 未受支持的daemon版本 %s，客户端版本为 %s 无污染 可更新 更新错误 更新映像 更新消息 更新状态 更新失败为已知问题，请访问此 URL 以获取详情： 现在更新吗？ 更新已配置远端的元数据 以当前 ROM 内容更新存储的加密哈希 更新存储的设备验证信息 使用当前内容更新存储的元数据 更新所有指定设备到最新的固件版本，如未指定更新所有设备 正在更新 正在更新 %s…… 升级 %s，从 %s 到 %s？ 立即上传数据？ 上传可更新列表到远程服务器 上传这些匿名结果到 %s 帮助其他用户？ 上传设备列表允许 %s 团队知道什么硬件，并允许我们施压不上传硬件固件更新的厂商。 上传固件报告可帮助硬件供应商尽快确定真实设备上更新的成功及失败案例。 紧急性 使用 %s 获取帮助 用 CTRL^C 取消。 已通知用户 用户名 VERSION1 VERSION2 [FORMAT] 有效 正在验证 ESP 内容…… 变型 供应商 验证 JCat 文件的签名 验证设备固件 正在验证… 版本 版本 [fwupd] 警告 WORD 等待设备出现 等待中… 监视硬件更改 将衡量更新前后系统完整性的各个要素 写入文件： 正在写入… 你应该确保对从恢复或安装磁盘恢复设置不感到紧张，因此更改可能导致开机无法进入 Linux 或导致其他系统不稳定。 你应该确保对从系统固件设置恢复设置不感到紧张，因此更改可能导致开机无法进入 Linux 或导致其他系统不稳定。 您的发行商可能尚未认证任何固件的系统及设备兼容性。 你的硬件使用此固件可能会损坏，而且安装此版本固件可能失去 %s 的保修。 你的系统被设为 %s 的最佳已知配置。 [APPSTREAM_ID] [设备ID|GUID] [设备ID|GUID] [分支] [DEVICE-ID|GUID] [VERSION] [DEVICE] [文件 文件签名 远程ID] [文件名1] [文件名2] [FWUPD-VERSION] [PCR] [REASON] [TIMEOUT] [REMOTE-ID] [USERNAME] [TOKEN] [SECTION] KEY VALUE [SETTING1] [SETTING2] [--no-authenticate] [SETTING1] [SETTING2]… [SMBIOS文件|HWIDS文件] GUID 使用客户端证书签名数据 coreboot 验证的启动 coreboot 验证的启动 coreboot 验证的启动阻止在设备开机时加载未签名的固件。 默认 fwupd 插件
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